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Abstract 
This research aims to shed light on the mechanism of agricultural biomass material competition between the power 
generation and straw pulp industries in a local area. A two-stage game model is set up based on the assumptions on 
biomass distribution and structure of collection cost to analyze parameters of equilibrium, such as unit transportation 
cost, and profit spaces. The condition and probability is derived from the solutions of game equilibrium. The results 
show that raw material competition will hardly bring about the sustainable development of the two industries based 
on agricultural residues in the assumed circular collection area. 
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1. Introduction 
The straw pulp and the power generation from agricultural residues in China will develop rapid ly due 
to the increasing demand for power and paper products. Agricultural residues is common material of 
these industries, and it is feared  that the raw material competit ion between the paper mills and  biomass 
power plant will result in a rapid increase in b iomass materials prices, which will pose a potential threat to 
both industries. Thus the competition for raw materials between these two industries is  a valuable topic 
that relates to the sustainability of the biomass supply, and the further development of the two industries. 
Paper mills that use straw pulp are scattered throughout the northern, eastern, and southern plains of 
China where wood pulp sources are deficient. Newly-developed technologies have gradually resolved the 
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problems of severe water consumption and pollution in the production of straw pulp. With the elimination 
of these barriers to the development of straw pulp, paper enterprises have amassed in eastern China, the 
competition for raw material originates both within and outside of the pulp industry. 
Biomass power generation is another agricu ltural biomass -consuming industry in China [1-2]. The 
Chinese government has attached great importance to the development and utilization of biomas s as an 
energy resource, and conducted long term and wide ranging R&D on the latest biomass energy 
conversion technologies through the National Program for Key Science and Technology projects [3]. As a 
result, more than 100 b iomass power generation projects are being planned for which raw material supply 
is a crit ical factor. Prev ious researches on raw material supply for pulp and paper mills and for biomass 
power plants have paid little attention to the agricultural biomass material competit ion problem. Fo r 
instance, Korhonen [4] adopted an industrial ecology perspective to study the recycling of matter and 
cascading of energy in a local/regional forest industry system in Finland. Th is study identified a system 
that included a pulp and paper mill and a biomass combined heating and power (CHP) plant in which 
material competition for round-wood and waste recycling existed simultaneously, with the pulp mill 
sending the black liquor and bark as fuel to CHP power p lant. However, Korhonen system was a 
conceptual framework that did not describe the degree of material competit ion and waste recycling. In 
their study on technical alternatives to decrease biomass and energy consumption in paper making 
processes, Holmberg et al. [5] also focused on a biomass power plant and a paper pulp mill in a forestry 
industrial system but did not specifically analyze the issues of material competition. 
Gielen et al. [6] provided a classification for biomass to show close relationships among food, 
materials, and energy crops. The primary markets for biomass residues are the energy market (i.e., 
heating, electricity, and transportation fuel), the materials market (i.e ., feedstock for plastics, wood 
products for construction, furniture manufacturing, pulp and paper), and the food and fod der market (i.e., 
dairy products, meat, cereal p roducts, oil products, fruits and vegetables). The possible existence of 
biomass material competition between these markets is identified.  
Related system analyses of biomass supply have dealt with forest res idues [7-9]. The accessibility of 
forest residues is better than that of agricultural residues since most of the forest residues can be collected 
as industrial material. Because agricultural residues may be used as a rural household energy source [10- 
11], they are only part ially available for energy conversion and papermaking. As such, the net available 
ratio of potential quantity in total agricultural residues is different from that of forest residues. Generally 
the system analyses on forest residues do not consider the net available ratio of residues, which is an 
important variable in the cost analysis of material competition for agricultural residues. 
Junginger et al. [12] presented a methodology for incorporating fuel supply strategies into large -scale 
biomass conversion units. This methodology focused on variations in residue quantities produced, limited 
accessibility of residues, utilizat ion by other competitors and logistical risks as demonstrated in the case 
of northeastern Thailand. They showed that residue quantities and prices can vary significantly due to 
fluctuating harvests, increased utilization by competitors, and variable transportation costs. While they 
concluded that assessing the risks associated with fuel supplies is vital for the success ful operation of 
large-scale bio-energy projects, their scenario analysis could not examine interactions among the 
competitors and suppliers. 
The present research aims to shed light on the nature and mechanis ms of agricultural b iomass material 
competition between power generation industry and straw pulp industry by analyzing agricultural 
biomass material market, and identify  the probability of a sustainable biomass supply for both pulp and 
paper industry and biomass power generation industry in a constantly  changing market. 
2. Model construction 
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2.1. Basic assumptions for biomass distribution 
Biomass distribution is assumed to satisfy the following conditions: 
(A1) there is quite a large-scale distribution of agricultural biomass; 
(A2) the variety of crops and planting conditions resulting in  differences in  biomass outputs are not 
significant;  
(A3) crops are uniformly d istributed; the ratio of planted land to non -planted land and the density of 
the crops are not variable within the collection area, agricultural biomass output in unit area is described 
as 
sq  (kg/m2); 
(A4) the crop growth period and the corresponding collection period of agricu ltural b iomass is one 
year, therefore the seasonality of different kinds of crops and climate factors are not considered in the 
model. 
(A5) the biomass collection area should be circular in order to minimize transportation costs, 
maximum rad ius of straw collection is maxR  (m), and radius of straw collection is R (m); if ratio of 
utilized biomass quantity to biomass output is k ( [0,1]k ), and collected quantity of biomass is Q , then 
it holds that 2
sQ kq RS (kg).  
Agricultural residue sources in close proximity to the end-buyer are accorded higher preference to 
more d istant agricultural biomass sources as in A5. Only when biomass sources in close proximity are 
exhausted, may more distant biomass be taken into account. Hence, the b iomass collection area should be 
circular in order to min imize transportation costs. Whereas a simplified circu lar operation pattern 
centered on a storage facility presents an economically efficient operation flow, this simplification 
neglects the transportation of biomass from multiple storage units to a central storage facility as well as 
mechanical and manual handling for loading and unloading, etc. For analytic simplicity, it  is assumed that 
large-scale logistic firms will be committed to collect, transport, and deposit the biomass in a circular area 
around a central storage facility as in Fig 1. Hence, temporarily many complicated and costly collection 
patterns are not considered. 
 
Fig. 1. Biomass collection area 
2.2. The supplier’s cost function and biomass collection pricing 
Pricing is based on different kinds of collection costs. Biomass collection costs are comprised of four 
parts1: 
(C1) the procurement cost of biomass from farmers. A farm is the production unit, with the 
procurement price g iven to the farmer (excluding transportation costs) being almost the same. Biomass 
price is transparent because of the lack of d ifferences in agricultural biomass in a region, especially in a 
close proximity area; and the distance from farm to buyers has no impact o n the procurement price of 
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biomass, 
sp (RMB Yuan/kg) represents procurement price for biomass from farmers, and pC  represents 
procurement cost (operation cost) of biomass (RMB Yuan), i.e. p sC p Q u . 
(C2) the transportation cost from farms to the storage facility. The unit transportation cost of biomass 
per kilogram per meter is described by tc  (RMB Yuan/ (kg. m)), and transportation cost of biomass 
collection is TCC  (RMB Yuan). 
(C3) the operation costs of storage, including loading and unloading costs, labor remuneration, and 
stock costs. Let 0c  represents unit operation cost of biomass (RMB Yuan/ kg), and oC operation cost 
excluding pC  and TCC  (RMB Yuan), i.e. o oC c Q u . 
(C4) the transportation cost from the storage facility to buyers. Transportation cost is linear with the 
demand and can only be considered as part of the buyers’ collection cost, let tc  denotes unit collect ion 
cost of biomass per kilogram for buyer (RMB Yuan/(kg. m)).  
cC  denotes total collect ion cost of biomass (RMB Yuan) for biomass supplier, i.e .  
c p TC o cC C C C c Q    u , and cc  represents unit total collection cost of biomass (RMB Yuan/ kg) for 
biomass supplier. 
Collection costs (C1) to (C3) are the basis of supplier pricing. Collection costs (C2) and (C4) are 
primarily determined by the unit transportation price and freight quantities. The local transportation 
market is competitive with biomass suppliers and buyers having no obvious influence on the unit 
transportation price. However,  the structure of transportation cost (C2) and (C4) is different due to freight 
forwarders, transportation distance, road status, and modes of transportation. Given that mini -vehicles are 
used by the farmers or the suppliers to transport biomass from farms  to storage facilit ies, the distances are 
uncertain but within the collection radius of the supplier. Large vehicles are used by suppliers to transport 
biomass from storage to buyers. Because these distances of this part are determinant, there is linear 
functional relationship between buyer freight quantities and transportation cost. There is little  
competitiveness in collection costs (C1) to (C3) as these are the basis of suppliers’ pricing for biomass 
collection, transportation and depositing. Let a  be base price increment for selling b iomass, and p be the 
inverse demand function, the following Lemma holds. 
Lemma  
According the assumptions (A1)-(A5) and agricultural biomass suppliers’ costs (C1)-(C3), the inverse 
demand function is  
0sa Q cpp b    
Where b  is defined as  
2
3
t
s
cb
kqS  
The lemma implies the specific inverse demand function for agricultural biomass collection in a 
circular area. 
2.3. The profit functions and game model 
Suppose there is a logistic firm committed to collect, transport, and deposit the biomass as upstream 
firm, and a biomass-fuel power plant and a paper-pulp plant that use agricultural biomass as downstream 
firms in a local biomass material market. It means that the biomass material market is upstream monopoly, 
and downstream duopoly, the game between upstream supplier and downstream buyers is based on price, 
the game between the two downstream firms is based on quantity competition. Because the product 
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quantities are linear with the biomass material, and the buyers’ decisions are limited to the choice of the 
quantity of biomass material. 
Variables related to the profit function of supplier and buyers are as follows: , ,jp j A B  maximum 
acceptable collection prices for the biomass power p lant or paper mill; , ,jQ j A B  Gross quantities of 
biomass collected for biomass power plant or paper mills, assuming that: 0, 0, 0A B A BQ Q Q Q Qt t   t ; 
, ,jd j A B  Distance from the buyer j  to the central storage; ', , ,t jC j A B Transportation cost of 
biomass from storage to buyer (RMB Yuan), i.e. '
,t j t j jC c d Q ;  ,   ,j j A BS  Profit function for biomass 
power plant or paper mill. 
Game model (I) 
The profit function for biomass material supplier is: 
1 ( )A Ba Q QS                                                                                                                              (1) 
The profit functions of the biomass power plant and paper mills are: 
 ( )A e A B Ap a b Q Q QS                                                                                                          (2) 
( )B p A B Bp a b Q Q QS                                                                                                          (3) 
Where
ep  and pp  are defined as: 
0se A t App p c c d  
                                                                                                               (4) 
0sp B t Bpp p c c d  
                                                                                                              (5) 
Definition 1 
ep a  is defined as fixed  profit  space for the biomass power plant; pp a  is defined as fixed profit 
space for the paper-pulp p lant. When 0a  ,
ep a  reach its maximum, thus ep  defined as maximum 
fixed profit space for the biomass power p lant; pp a  reach its maximum, thus pp  defined as maximum 
fixed profit space for the paper-pulp plant. 
The above definition excludes those unit transportation costs which are related with the demand 
quantities. 
The timing of game: 
Stage 1: The downstream buyers seek individual Nash equilibrium biomass quantity under Cournot 
game based on the any given price increment for the maximum profits. 
Stage 2: The upstream supplier seeks Nash equilibrium price increment under Nash equilibrium 
solution in Stage 1. 
3. Equilibrium Analyses 
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If *, ,jQ j A B  represents optimal solution for , ,jQ j A B , and *a  optimal solution for base price 
increment, the following propositions hold. 
Proposition 1 
If biomass distribution is assumed to satisfy (A1) to (A5), and biomass collection costs are comprised 
of (C1) to (C4), there exists only one sub-game completeness equilibrium solution of Game model (I) as 
follows: 
*
2
4 ( )(17 13 )
225A e p e p
Q p p p p
b
       (For biomass power plant)                                               (6) 
*
2
4 ( )(17 13 )
225B e p p e
Q p p p p
b
       (For paper-pulp plant)                                                     (7) 
*
( )
6
e pp p
a
     (For biomass material supplier)                                                                       (8) 
The response functions of two firms at any a are: 
2
4( ) ( 2 )(3 2 )
25A e p e p
Q a p p a p p a
b
                                                                                    (9) 
2
4( ) ( 2 )(3 2 )
25B e p p e
Q a p p a p p a
b
                                                                                    (10) 
Proposition 2 
The profits of the biomass power plant, paper mills and biomass material supplier u nder equilib rium 
solution in Game model (I) are as follows: 
* 2
2 ( )(17 13 )750
s
A e p e p
t
kq
p p p p
c
SS   
                                                                                        (11) 
* 2
2 ( )(17 13 )750
s
B e p p e
t
kq
p p p p
c
SS   
                                                                                         (12) 
* 3
1 2
2 ( )
375
s
e p
t
kq
p p
c
SS  
                                                                                                               (13) 
The total profit is: 
* * * * 3
1 2 ( )125
s
A B e p
t
kq
p p
c
SS S S S    
                                                                                       (14) 
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 imply that the critical parameters of the profits, 
ep  and pp are 
positively related to the total profit, while tc  is negatively related to the total profit. sp , 0c  and 
transportation cost from the central storage to buyer are the other main parts of collection cost, having 
indirect impacts on the total profit through the buyers’ maximum fixed profit space. The appearance of 
new technologies in the two industries may have direct impacts on Ap  and Bp , then indirect impacts on 
ep  and pp . 
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Conditions for game equilibrium are introduced by the following corollary. 
Corollary 1 
If biomass distribution is assumed to satisfy (A1) to (A5), and biomass collection costs are comprised 
of (C1) to (C4), the condition for game equilibrium is: 
max
2 [ ]
5t e p
c p p
R
t   or 
max
2( )
2.5
A B s o
t
A B
p p p c
c
R d d
  t    
The corollary implies that the min imum unit transportation cost of biomass per kilogram per meter is 
not only positively influenced by the maximum acceptable co llect ion prices of the material buyers, but 
also negatively by their locations in a circular collection area with given radius maxR .  
4. Possibility of material supply for both firms 
It is d ifficult  for investors to decide whether to enter a new industry because the possibility of 
industrial co-existence is unknown. Sometimes investors pay more attention to the possibility of material 
supply. In the planning period, both of the firms estimate that the local supply of agricultural biomass  is 
sufficient for their production scale. Therefore, for simplicity we assume that: 
(A6) both of biomass-fuel power generation plant and paper-pulp plant estimate that they will need the 
biomass material no more than the half of maximum supply in the circular area. L denotes the sum of 
their estimation of maximum profits. Then  
max max1 1( ) ( )
2 2e p
p Q p Q L  
                                                                                                        (15) 
It can be simplified as  
 
max
2
e p
Lp p MQ                                                                                                                      (16) 
where M  is defined as:
max
2LM Q     
In (A6), the sum L of firms’ estimations on maximum profits is fixed and maximum acceptable 
collection prices for the two firms combine satisfying (16) in different ways. 
Numerical examples of material supply for both firms  are shown as follows. From formulas (8), (9) 
and (10) the following figures can be easily derived: 
          
Fig. 2. Optimal pricing is not determined                                      Fig. 3. Optimal pricing is determined 
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In Fig. 2, we assume 5 unitep  , 7 unitpp   and it is rationally assumed that 0 min( , )e pa p pd d , 
otherwise at least one of the buyers will have negative demand from ( 9) and (10). Temporarily 
3 unita  as shown in Fig. 2. The fixed profit space of paper mill is 7 3 4 unitpp a    ; the fixed 
profit space for the b iomass power plant is 5 3 2 unitep a    . When the sum of pp , ep  is determined, 
for example, 12e pp p   unit, we have different combination ( , )p ep p of pp and ep . From formula (9), 
line 3 2e pp p a   intercepts line 12e pp p  on 3M , and from formula (10) line 3 2p ep p a   
intercepts line 12e pp p   on 2M . Then, if 2 3( , ) [ , ]p ep p M M , ( ) 0AQ a t  and ( ) 0BQ a t  hold;  
if 1 2( , ) [ , ]p ep p M M , then ( ) 0 AQ a t and ( ) 0BQ a d  hold, which means the paper mill has material  
supply while the power p lant has not for the material market competit ion; 3 4( , ) [ , ]p ep p M M , 
( ) 0 AQ a d  and ( ) 0BQ a t  are satisfied, which  means the biomass power p lant has material supply while 
the paper mill has not.  
Fig. 3 shows the case that the optimal pricing is determined by the biomass supplier; we also 
assume 5 unitpp  and 7 unitep  . From formulas (14), if * 2 unita a  , the fixed profit space of paper 
mill is 7 2 5 unitpp a    ; and the fixed profit space for the biomass power plant 
is 5 2 3 unitep a    . From formula (9), line *3 2e pp p a   intercepts line 12e pp p  on 5M , and 
from formula (10) line *3 2p ep p a   intercepts line 12e pp p   on 6M . 5 6[ , ]M M  in Fig. 3 is longer 
than 2 3[ , ]M M  in  Fig. 2, which means if the supplier considers the optimal pricing, more combinations 
of ( , )p ep p will result in * 0AQ t *and 0BQ t , and the possibility of material market supply for both firms 
becomes greater. It is also true that if a  becomes s maller than *a , the possibility of material market 
supply for both firms continuously becomes greater, but the supplier cannot get its maximum profit.  
The results can be generalized to the case when 
e pp p M   holds. 
5. Conclusions 
Agricultural biomass material competit ion will emerge in the biomass supply market as a consequence 
of the fast development of the straw pulp and biomass power generation. This will be exacerbated by the 
appearance of new technologies in the two industries, which has some impacts on the price and demand 
of agricultural biomass supply. 
The competit ion mechanis m is exp lored through game analysis in  this research. The theoretical results 
show that the maximum acceptable collection prices and d ifferent kinds of costs for the two industries 
have critical impacts on the optimal pricing of the supplier, the unit transportation price in the local 
transportation market, and increase the possibility of the agricu ltural biomass material competition, as 
well as on the profits of paper pulp plant, biomass power plant and biomass supplier. From parameter 
analysis, it is shown that the unit transportation cost in the local transportation market will rise with the 
increase of the maximum acceptable collection prices of the buyers, which will raise the price of material 
supply, but when the co llect ion area or the collection rad ius are increased, it will have negative influence 
on the unit transportation cost. 
Generally speaking, the agricultural b iomass is very cheap when it is not utilized in large-scale. The 
local government expects that the income of farmers will increase from agricultural residues and will 
encourage the investors to invest in the projects based on biomass. Pract ically the investors are optimistic 
about the supply of raw materials in the beginning, but when the projects are built  and operated, they find 
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that the biomass price and unit transportation cost gradually rises and material competit ion appears. The 
last part of the research shows that only one project is proper for the operation in  a circular collection area, 
and the possibility to run two firms such as the paper pulp plant and biomass power generation under 
supplier’s and buyers’ profit maximization is very small. 
Though the model characterized the supply market of agricultural biomass, some assumptions can be 
improved. The investors may have surveyed the material competit ion in other material markets, and will 
have more rat ional expectation of biomass material supply, and so the possibility to run more than one 
firm in a circular area may be greater. The operation stage is simplified in the research which can be 
improved to include more processes and costs. 
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